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Paths in Heidegger's Later Thought, edited by Günter Figal, Diego D'Angelo, Tobias Keiling, and Guang Yang, gathers essays related to Heidegger's later philosophy. The book is divided into four main sections: "Language, *Logos*, and Rhythm", "Heidegger's *Physis*", "Phenomenology, the Thing, and the Fourfold", and "Ground, Non-ground, and Abyss".

In the first section, concerning Heidegger's focus on language, Jeff Malpas's essay, "'The House of Being': Poetry, Language, Place", examines Heidegger's renewed interest in language, which "coincides with a more explicit turn [from time] toward the topological – toward *topos*, or place (*Ort*/*Ortschaft*)" (p. 15). This topological turn, developed from Heidegger's engagement with Hölderlin's work and his text, *Letter on Humanism* (1947), gathers the themes of language, poetry, and place. Recalling Heidegger's famous image of language as the "house of Being", Malpas argues that, on the one hand, the notion of place is fundamental to understanding Heidegger's conception of language and Being, and on the other hand, that poetry is the medium through which language discloses its true nature. The theme of poetry is further deepened in Markus Wild's essay "Heidegger and Trakl: Language Speaks in the Poet's Poem". Wild criticizes the tendency of the current scholarly literature to overlook the influence of Trakl on Heidegger's later thought. By challenging the diffuse idea in the literature by which Heidegger opposes some traditional ideas to replace them (cf. p. 46), the author underscores how Heidegger's criticism aims instead to disclose a deeper meaning. The traditional conception of language, which Heidegger considers still correct but unsuitable to let us think about language as such, allows this disclosure. Diego D'Angelo, in "Toward a Hermeneutic Interpretation of

Greeting and Destiny in Heidegger's Thinking", explores the link between the "destiny" (*Geschick*) of Being and the "greeting" (*Grüßen*) of the gods and the holy. Emphasizing the ontological primacy of greeting over destiny that emerges in Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin's poetry, the author shows "how an understanding of the meaning of Being's destiny presupposes an understanding of the poetical greeting" (p. 66). The poet is conceived as a *demigod*, who, by mediating between gods and mortals, positions them in relation to Being. The greeting gathers ideal and real, past and future in a unity that structures the destiny of Being. In "Later Heidegger's Naturalism", Tristan Moyle provides a naturalistic interpretation of later Heidegger. Far from reducing Heidegger's concept of language to that of the natural sciences, the author's proposal is to trace Heidegger's "abstract, speculative content, content that appears quite puzzling and unworldly, back to a vocabulary that is rooted in ordinary, concrete, natural existence" (p. 85). Moyle carries on the naturalization of Heidegger's lexicon by introducing concepts such as the idea of a rhythm of experience – a hidden mode of functioning of our natural powers – which the author derives from what Heidegger, in a seminar on Heraclitus (1966-1967), calls the "*rythmos* (ῥυθμός)" of language. This interpretation offers valuable insights into some of the most relevant themes of later Heidegger, such as those of language and *Ereignis*.

The second section, which focuses on Heidegger's analysis of the Greek concept of *physis* (φύσις), begins with Thomas Buchheim's essay "Why is Heidegger Interested in *Physis*?", in which he investigates how Heidegger, while stressing the importance of the notion of *physis* in the inceptual Greek conception from the Presocratics, in 1939 finds the last traces of pre-Socratic in Aristotle. Since the 1920s, a connection between Dasein and *physis* emerged in Heidegger's texts, and, Buchheim writes, "it becomes clear here that in Heidegger's opinion, Dasein is world projecting (i.e., temporalizing) by comporting itself according to the way of φύσις: faithful to the φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ and through the κρύπτεσθαι […] φύσις reveals the being of beings in the unconcealment of a world" (pp. 117-118). In his essay "Being as *Physis*: The Belonging Together of Movement and Rest in the Greek Experience of *Physis*", Guang Yang highlights the often overlooked intertwining of movement and rest that characterizes

Heidegger's thinking on *physis*. Yang links the Aristotelian concept of force or possibility (δύναμις) with Heidegger's interpretation of *physis*, to understand it, from a phenomenological perspective, as a kinetic force that unites movement and rest. The author concludes that "φύσις is not dissolving but heightening the tension of movement and rest, gathering it into an eminent unity" (p. 129). In the following essay, "The End of Philosophy and the Experience of Unending *Physis*", Claudia Baracchi focuses on the historical possibilities disclosed at the end of philosophy exposed in "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" (1969). At this historical threshold, truth is experienced as its inceptional meaning of "unconcealment", and, as the author argues, this inceptional experience of truth anticipates the metaphysical conception of truth. Experience is regarded as "a matter of dwelling in the proximity of that which […] shows itself – of the terrible exercise of patience and hesitation, of the ability to wait, letting oneself be overcome by that which comes to be" (p. 158). Damir Barbarić, in "Thinking at the First Beginning: Heidegger's Interpretation of the Early Greek *Physis*", highlights the tension between emergence, coming forth, and the aspects of standing (*Stehen*) and self-withholding, which is concealed in the notion of *physis*. In Heidegger's view, the ancient Greeks conceived Being as *physis,* i.e., manifestation, which is linked to the Greek feeling of wonder (θαυμάζειν): "As Heidegger describes it, the state of wonder repeats the dynamic of φύσις: the human, awestruck, retreats from what is present and, in this retreating and self-restraining, is at the same time drawn to and, as it were, held fast by that from which one retreats" (p. 169). Eventually, these phenomenal traits were covered by the metaphysical idea of substance (οὐσία).

In the first essay of the third section, which revolves around Heidegger's interest in a phenomenological form of philosophy, "*Tautóphasis:* Heidegger and Parmenides", Günter Figal discusses Heidegger's interpretation of the Parmenidean statement that Being and perceiving are the same (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι). This idea "'speaks so much *more revealingly* and thus more precisely than we do,' […]. This revealing does not name by pointing or identifying but, rather […], in naming, it immediately allows what is to be revealed to reveal itself" (p. 182). The phenomena, i.e., what are named, reveal themselves because naming is equated to the named.

Rather than using the word *tautology,* Heidegger "speaks of *tautóphasis*, which he also translates as 'saying-two-together' [*Selbander-sage*] and clarifies as 'phenomenophasis'" (p. 183). However, as Figal argues, referring to the Zähringen seminar, "tautological thinking" (*tautologisches Denken*) may result in aporias, since it cannot convincingly give an account of differences between manifestations in reality. In the following essay "Radical Contextuality in Heidegger's Postmetaphysics: The Singularity of Being and the Fourfold", Jussi Backman argues that a radical contextuality characterizes Heidegger's thinking, which, since it questions the fundamental assumptions of the Western metaphysical tradition, could be described as "postmetaphysical". The transition (*Ubergang*) from metaphysics to the other inception (*der andere Anfang*) is the movement from the understanding of the transcendental universality of Being, to a post-metaphysical conception of Being as singularization. The idea of the singularity (*Einmaligkeit*) of each event, moving from the inherent temporal structure of Being, is the hallmark of ontological meaning. An example of this idea is the image of the fourfold (*Geviert*): it "articulates the basic structure of the multidimensional context that individuates and singularizes a thing as a situated instance of meaningful presence" (p. 197). Nikola Mirković, in "The Phenomenon of Shining", explores Heidegger's influence in the text, *All Things Shining*, written by Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly. Their interpretation of shining does not completely follow Heidegger's conception: in fact, their interpretation of the phenomenon of shining is dependent on the background practices of one's own culture. On the other hand, Heidegger's later work offers an account of the phenomenological meaning of shining, necessary in order to grasp it in its entirety. During the time when he engages with Nietzsche in the 1930s, Heidegger – similar to Plato – considers shining as the sign of manifestation of beauty; as expressed in his correspondence with Emil Staiger in the 1950s, Heidegger conceives shining as still present in this age and sees in shining the promise of a renewal of the meaning of things and the world in which we live. In his essay "A Brief History of Things: Heidegger and the Tradition", Andrew J. Mitchell summarizes Heidegger's history of things, from the ancient Greeks to the moderns, passing through Aristotle's natural philosophy and Eckhart's concept of *dinc*. "Exploring this

history of the thing reveals a fundamental tension between what we might call an 'objectification' or 'encapsulation' of the thing and a thinking of the thing as embedded in a network of relations, as relational, a tension central to Heidegger's thinking of the fourfold as well" (p. 227). Heidegger's reflection highlights the tendency in the history of philosophy towards objectification.

The fourth section, focused on the notion of "ground" (*Grund*) that characterizes Heidegger's later reflections on ontology, begins with Hans Ruin's "Heidegger, Leibniz, and the Abyss of Reason", which examines Heidegger's engagement with Leibniz, from the 1920s to his lecture course *On the Essence of Ground* in 1955. Heidegger "refuses to accept [Leibniz's] principle [of sufficient reason] […] as a 'principium,' as what comes *first*. Instead, he raises the question of what being must be like in order for the quest for a reason or foundation – for a *Grund* – to appear in the first place" (p. 246). By questioning Leibniz's notion of truth as identity and conceiving the whole world as what becomes accessible only through the transcending movement of Dasein, Heidegger affirms that the principle of reason must be grounded in the freedom of Dasein. In his 1955 course, he reduces Leibniz's thought to a form of "calculating" rationality and relinquishes the Leibnizian principle in favor of meditative thinking that progresses "without why". In her essay "Ground, Abyss, and Primordial Ground: Heidegger in the Wake of Schelling", Sylvaine Gourdain argues that, thanks to his engagement with Schelling's idea of "ground of existence" (*Grund von Existenz*), Heidegger breaks free from the transcendental without renouncing the concept of ground, redefining it instead by emphasizing its inherent negativity. The so-conceived ground "is rather a soil that withdraws, an abyssal base for every being or existence […]. In contrast, 'Ex-sistenz' is aptly characterized by Heidegger as '*what emerges from itself* and in *emerging reveals itself*'" (p. 264). Heidegger conceives the difference between the ground and existence as strife, a contraposing duality that influences his later thought, e.g., the idea of strife between earth and world in "On the Origin of the Work of Art" and his notion of a "grounding" (*Gründung*) in *Contributions to Philosophy*. In the final contribution, "*Erklüftung*: Heidegger's Thinking of Projection in *Contributions to Philosophy*", Tobias Keiling criticizes the inherent contradiction in *Erklüftung*,

"sundering", a concept which evokes the images of a projection and a ground. "Not only is Dasein projected and projecting at once but it is also said to be the *ground* (*Grund*) of its own projection. […] How can we think about ourselves as both an abiding ground and a continuous projection into an open future?" (p. 287). Later, Heidegger rejects *Erklüftung* in favor of the better-known concept of *Lichtung*. This, for the author, is a clear sign that Heidegger himself realized the inherent contradiction in the concept of *Erklüftung*.

This anthology provides wide-ranging insights into the main themes of late Heideggerian thought. It offers not only contributions that examine the key concepts of Heideggerian philosophy, their development and relation to other philosophers' and poets' thought, but also original essays that propose peculiar hermeneutical solutions to understanding Heidegger and bring Heidegger into dialogue with later authors who have been influenced by his thought. The book is thus a worthwhile reading for those who seek opportunities for in-depth study and productive reworking of the themes that characterize Heidegger's later thought.

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