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Haecceities have often been portrayed as obscure entities. Various conceptions of *haecceities* have emerged in the literature, leading to confusion and debate over their precise ontological status. Nonetheless, as argued in the book, it seems that haecceities can constantly serve a key philosophical function: they are the principles of individuation for particular objects. In other words, *haecceities* are invoked to explain what makes an individual—say, Socrates—the very individual he is. Thus, *haecceities* mark the singularity and individuality of particular objects.

The book is structured into three main parts. First, there is a historical investigation into the significant approaches to haecceities that have been defended in the literature (Chapter 1). Second, it offers a clear and systematic presentation of the different accounts of haecceities developed in contemporary philosophy, focusing on questions regarding the nature and existence of haecceities (Chapters 2–5). Finally, going beyond the investigation of the nature of *haecceities*, the book includes a discussion on the epistemology of *haecceities* (Chapter 6) and a consideration of their potential applications in philosophical debates (Chapter 7).

Chapter 1 surveys historical views on haecceities, from John Duns Scotus to Gary Rosenkrantz (1993). This overview traces the evolution of *haecceities*, from their early understanding as individual substantial forms under Aristotle's hylomorphic framework to their later treatment as properties in 20th-century philosophy.

Chapter 2 begins an investigation into the nature of haecceities, a discussion that extends through chapter 5. It outlines three main views. The first, Partism, holds that haecceities are parts of objects, whether understood in a hylomorphic sense as substantial form or as tropes (particularised properties) or bare particulars (Chisholm (1990)) in non-hylomorphic frameworks. The

second view sees *haecceities* as primitive properties: unanalysable properties that do not include individuals as constituents but function to individuate. This position is defended by philosophers such as Plantinga (1975), Adams (1979), Rosenkrantz (1993), and Diekemper (2015). The third view is Constituentism, where haecceities are properties exemplified by individuals, with the individual as a constituent. The author distinguishes between slot-theoretic Constituentism, where a *haecceity* is formed by placing an individual in an identity relation, and sui generis Constituentism, given a sui generis abstract object, being identical with x, Socrates is plugged into it. Matthew Davidson sustains that Constituentism is the best option available. The arguments proposed at the end of the chapter are developed in two distinctive ways. First, he discredits the viability of the Partist View. The author expresses scepticism towards tropes or substantial forms, finding it implausible that properties are simply a collection needing a bare or thin particular to hold them together. Additionally, the author rejects Chisholm's view that haecceities are point-sized objects located within substances, as this would exclude the possibility of *haecceities* for abstract objects. Second, he discredits the primitivist account by expressing the possible virtue of Constituentism. In particular, Constituentism is preferable to primitivism because it provides a more precise account of the qualitative-quidditative distinction, allows for a uniform semantic treatment of rigid terms, and explains similarities between different *haecceities*. Moreover, constituentism offers a more coherent account of how we grasp the haecceities of ordinary objects and aligns with the principle of no necessary connections between distinct existences.

Chapter 3 presents arguments for the existence of *haecceities*, divided into two types. On the one hand, Individuative arguments defend *haecceities* based on their metaphysical role in individuation. It is worth noting that the arguments rely on the individuate power of haecceities in the sense of the ability to discriminate between objects metaphysically. Indeed, the author proposes the main arguments in favour of the existence of *haecceities* as entities able to provide a ground for the distinction between indiscernible objects (Adams (1979), Diekemper (2009)). On the other hand, with Semantic arguments, the author considers that *haecceities* can

serve as the semantic contents of linguistic expression, e.g., proper names like Socrates or indexical like "I", "this", and "that" (p. 60). Additionally, haecceities help interpret quidditative predicates like "is Socrates" and give truth conditions for modal sentences, strengthening their role in semantic theory (p. 62). The author ends the chapter's discussion by providing an intense reply to the principal objections against the existence of haecceities proposed by the philosophical literature.

Chapter 4 classifies properties into qualitative and non-qualitative (quidditative) properties. The author argues that the constituentist distinction between qualitative and quidditative properties is superior to alternative views. For example, the linguistic view (Adams, 1979), the entailment view (Hawley, 2009), the dependence view (Ingram, 2019), and the relational view (Vera Hoffmann-Kolss, 2019), each offer competing accounts, but constituentism provides a more robust explanation by grounding quidditative properties in having particular objects as constituents.

Chapter 5 closes the discussion on the nature of *haecceities* and addresses whether they can exist unexemplified. It examines the ontological dependence relation between *haecceities* and the individuals they individuate. The debate centres on whether sufficient reasons exist to affirm or deny the existence of unexemplified *haecceities*.

Chapter 6 focuses on the epistemology of *haecceities*, precisely our ability to be acquainted with them. The author engages with arguments both for and against the possibility of accessing and grasping haecceities (Rosenkratz (1993), Chisolm (1976)). After analysing the reasoning behind both positions, the author concludes that it is possible to grasp and be acquainted with *haecceities* in the case of material objects.

Finally, Chapter 7 explores the application of haecceities, particularly with Ingram's presentist account of time (Ingram, 2016, 2018, 2019), which incorporates *haecceities*. Roughly, Presentism about time is the view that there are no past and future entities, just present, and entities in the present exist. *Haecceities* might come into help in this type of account since, with analogous argumentation for the cross-worlds, counterfactual accounts (Plantinga (1975), Adams (1979)), it is possible to justify the truth of propositions that have past or future entities as a constituent (e.g., <Socrates was a

philosopher>). The chapter has two aims: first, to demonstrate the use of haecceities within a contemporary philosophical debate; second, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Ingram's position.

In *About Haecceity*, Matthew Davidson explores critical arguments concerning the nature and metaphysical functions of *haecceities* while presenting arguments for his preferred account. *Haecceities* are considered properties instantiated by individuals. In particular, the haecceity of an individual, say Socrates, is the property "being Socrates" instantiated by Socrates and nothing else. As explained in Chapter 3, *haecceities* serve two key metaphysical roles: individuating and representing individuals in possible worlds where those individuals are absent, helping explain the truth of modal statements and identity across possible worlds (e.g., Matthew Davidson being a philosopher in the actual world, @, but an FBI detective in a possible world w1). In Chapter 3, Davidson supports Constituentism, arguing that *haecceities* are relational properties of the form "being x", where an individual instance, like Socrates, is a constituent of the property. Therefore, Constituentism is requested to provide a valuable reading of the two prominent metaphysical roles of *haecceities*. First, *haecceities* must accomplish an individuating role. While defending the existence of *haecceities* and providing arguments in support of their existence (§3.1), it is worth noting that the author finds it difficult to justify their existence purely based on their individuating power in terms of Singleness (§3.1.1). Instead, he finds the individual arguments from Distinctness more robust. Despite reluctance, it is possible to characterise individuation in terms of Singleness. In particular, following Lowe (2012), individuation can be characterised as an asymmetric dependence relation where an entity (the individuator) determines or fixes the identity or nature of a particular individual, resulting in that individual being individuated. In other words, individuation determines that, given a single individual, say, Socrates, Socrates is the very individual he is. Once individuation is characterised as an asymmetric dependence relation that determines the nature of Socrates, it seems plausible to argue that such an explanation cannot always be brute, giving value to the individuating power of haecceities for individuals' Singleness. However, if individuation is accounted for in this way, and Constituentism

is assumed, then *haecceities* lose their individuating power from Singleness. In effect, if *haecceities* have individuals as constituents, they cannot serve as individuators since they presuppose the individuals that are supposed to be individuated as a constituent of the *haecceity* itself. A similar problem arises with Adams' account of *haecceities* (Adams, 1979).

Second, *haecceities* are considered proxies of individuals in possible worlds (Plantinga, 1975). For this to work, as the author considers in Chapter 5, *haecceities* must exist in all possible worlds, even without their individuals, implying that *haecceities* are necessary while individuals are contingent. Davidson's Constituentism leans toward rejecting uninstantiated haecceities, as individuals play an essential role in the constitution of their *haecceities*. Notably, haecceities require their individuals to come into existence, determining a form of ontological dependence between individuals and their *haecceities* (Koslicki, 2012). However, Davidson proposes (§5.2.1) that even if Socrates is an essential constituent of "being Socrates", this relation could hold without Socrates' existence. Yet, in a similar vein to Williamson (2013), one might ask: how does haecceity maintain its strict relation to its individual if the individual is absent? A clarification on how the relation of constitution is maintained despite the individual absence could have been valuable.

Overall, Matthew Davidson's investigation in *About Haecceity* is clear and well-structured. It thoroughly explores haecceities, evaluating the various accounts and their implications within contemporary philosophical debates. By beginning with John Duns Scotus, Davidson offers a historical and conceptual lens through which to understand the evolution of *haecceities*. The work stands out as a focused study on the nature of *haecceities*, making it both a valuable guide and a critical resource for those wishing to engage with these entities' complexities, strengths and limitations. In addition to offering a comprehensive historical and philosophical analysis, Davidson's work suggests future research. His arguments clarify longstanding issues and open new avenues for exploring the role of haecceities in metaphysics, particularly in the context of modal, identity theories, and epistemology.

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